








Department of Software Engineering







We propose here to look at how abstract a model of a usable system can be, but still say
something useful and interesting, so this paper is an exercise in abstraction and formalisation,
with usability-of-design as an example target use.
We take the view that when we claim to be designing a usable system we have, at the
very least, to give assurances about its usability properties. This is a very abstract notion,
but provides the basis for future work, and shows, even at this level that there are things to
say about the (very concrete) business of designing and building usable, interactive systems.
Various forms of verification and validation can provide a high level of assurance but it
can be very costly, and there is clearly a lot of resistance to doing things this way.
In this paper, we introduce the idea of usable-by-construction, which adopts and applies
the ideas of correct-by-construction to (very abstractly) thinking about usable systems.
We give a set of construction rules or tactics to develop designs of usable systems, and we
also formalize them into a state suitable for, for example, a proof assistant to check claims
made for the system as designed.
In the future, these tactics would allow us to create systems that have the required us-
ability properties and thus provide a basis to a usable-by-construction system. Also, we
should then go on to show that the tactics preserve properties by using an example system
with industrial strength requirements. And we might also consider future research directions.
Research highlights:
• Abstraction is a key design method;
• Compositionality helps to structure designs
1 Introduction
The position taken in this paper is that more abstraction in the methods for modelling and
designing interactive systems would be a good thing, certainly as a starting point for design. The
paper can be seen as an exercise in formalisation and also pushing abstraction to an extreme.
The aim of this paper is to introduce the idea of usable-by-construction. This, in essence,
takes the ideas of correct-by-construction that formed much of the work of Dijkstra [7], Gries [9]
and many others, and applies them to the problem of usable systems. In particular we want to
see how we can develop a set of construction rules or tactics which allow us to build designs of
usable systems without having to perform, say, post hoc verification on the constructed system.
That is, we want tactics that can build only usable systems: any system built with the tactics
will necessarily have the required usabilty properties simply due to the nature of the construction
tactics themselves.
Since we are trying to hit the spot between maximum abstraction and maximum simplicity, we
leave the question “what exactly do you mean by usable?” unanswered. If pressed for an answer
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we would say that our abstraction allows any answer to that question that you personally are
happy to accept. Here we are totally agnostic about what usable means. Think of the definition
of usable as being a parameter of our rules.
1.1 Related work
Within the formal methods for HCI world there are no directly related works to what we are
presenting here. This is not surprising since we have gone to extremes to be abstract. However,
there is a very long and distinguished seam of work recorded in the DSV-IS series (1994-2008)
of conferences [1], in the FMIS workshop series (for example [8],[10]), and, more recently (and
continuing the DSV-IS tradition) the EICS series of conferences [2] and the (now) associated
ACM journal [3]. There is also the work of Celentano and Dubois [5] on metaphors, which give
one way of seeing the range of possibilities for instantiating our abstract models. There is also the
work of Bowen and Reeves [4] and their various papers. Both these bodies of work also consider
the role of refinement or reification which, as we note later, is a needed step towards instantiation
and (ultimately, if required) implementation. In the case of Bowen and Reeves [4] the formality
introduced here can be preserved through the subsequent instantiation and implementation to a
high degree, and Celentano and Dubois’s [5] work, while not allowing preservation of formality,
does show how informal reification can be used instead.
All that said, the work in this paper is entirely prior to all of that referred to and cited above.
1.2 Summary
In this paper we are doing two things: developing a framework of rules for building a usable
system; ensuring that rules we define enforce certain good design and development techniques.
The aims of these techniques can be summarised by saying that we are trying to bring some
good engineering principles to bear, namely:
• model a system before going to the expense of building it;
• use maths to check that the system is fit for purpose;
• for a good design, don’t get concrete too early or we’ll lock ourselves into design choices
too soon;
• build a system, not by adding features at will and on the fly—but in a controlled, structured
way as this keeps complexity under control.




• compositionality (i.e. start with a small set of very simple, basic actions and then have a




We assume that each system is made up of components (which might be people, computers,
software systems and so on right down to simple widgets) and connections between them. A
connection represents a use of one component by the other: if c uses d then we have a connection
〈c, d〉. That is almost all we say, so we are going for maximum generality here.
We make the following definitions.
Definition 1 A system is 〈C ,N 〉, where C is a component set {c1, c2, ..., cn}, and N is a
connection set, {n1,n2, ...,nm}, where each nj = 〈ci , ck 〉 for some ci , ck ∈ C .
This definition is a starting point, but it clearly too general to be very interesting. With
our problem in mind, namely designing usable systems, we introduce two further ideas. Firstly,
we have a subset of C , called I , which is a set of components which can be interacted with.
Secondly, each interactive component, i ∈ I , is associated with its own set of components that
are allowed to interact with it, Ai , which we refer to as an interactive component’s allowed set.
For a component to be allowed access to an interactive component, that component needs to
be added into the allowed set of that interactive component. These sets of “allowed” components
can be thought of as expressing propositions about the system.
The key point here is: assuming that allowing the components access to the interactive
components is sensible or allowable (a decision of the designers, perhaps based on experimental
or past design knowledge or experience, etc.), the system as whole is accepted as usable.
The sets can be thought of sets of permissions too: if a component is in an interactive
component’s allowed set then that component has permission to use that interactive component
while keeping the whole system ajudged as usable.
We refer to systems with these two additional sets as acceptable systems.
Definition 2 An acceptable system 〈C ,N , I ,A〉 extends a system 〈C ,N 〉, where I ⊆ C is a
set of components that are interactive and A is a family of sets of components
⋃
i Ai , where for
i ∈ I , Ai ⊆ C . Ai is a set of components allowed (for agreed reasons) to use the interactive
component i.
Now we need to think of how we can combine such systems, via tactics, preserving usability—
so we are going for a compositional approach here. These tactics are connect, disconnect, create,
and delete.
In what follows we make the (surely benign) assumption that every component has access to
itself.
3 Tactics
We introduce various rules (which we call tactics) for building systems from smaller systems,
and ultimately from single components, with the aim that the result of each tactic, assuming
we start with usable systems, will necessarily be usable systems. Note that this system is very
liberal, in the sense that connections between systems containing interactive components are
generally allowed, but we also without exception keep track of what components have access to
what interactive components. So, usability here comes about because we are completely open
and honest about who has access to what.
Later, as we will see, we make the modelling more realistic by introducing the notion of
“usability-enhancing” (to be discussed) and we use this to control which components have access
to interactive components.
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Recall that our overall plan is to have simple rules to start with, see how far we can get,
then introduce further rules carefully to get us closer to our aim, without disturbing (as far as
possible) the simplicity of the modelling.
To help the presentation we introduce the notion of a path:
Definition 3 Given a system Σ = 〈C ,N , I ,A〉, a path exists between components c and c′ in
C , which we write as c  Σ c′, iff either:
1. c is connected to c′, i.e. 〈c, c′〉 ∈ N , or
2. there is some d ∈ C such that c  Σ d and 〈d , c′〉 ∈ N
We drop the subscript where the context allows, and we iterate the notion of path, so that, for
example, c  d  e abbreviates c  d ∧ d  e. Also, by ∀ c ∈ a  b.P we mean that all
components on the path between a and b satisfy the predicate P .
3.1 Connect Tactic
The connect tactic adds a connection between two components of a system under certain condi-
tions. (We can also see this rule as allowing us to join two such systems together via the joined
components. In the full treatment we have rules to deal with this eliding of meaning.) This is
done by creating a connection between two components.
Definition 4 Connects to
If Σ = 〈C ,N , I ,A〉 then making a new connection between ca and cb in C means creating
Σ′ = 〈C ,N ∪ {〈ca , cb〉}, I ,A〉, and 〈ca , cb〉 /∈ N with the condition that:
∀ i ∈ I .∀ c, d ′ ∈ C .∀ d ∈ cb  d ′.∀ c′ ∈ c  ca .d ∈ Ai ⇒ c′ ∈ Ai
The condition here simply says that any elements on any path c  ca that gets joined to
a path cb  d , where this path contains elements allowed access to any interactive component,
must already be allowed access to those same interactive components. This is, of course, a very
general condition, i.e. it means that almost every component in any system might have to be
allowed access to almost all interactive elements in that system. For the moment, though, we
are concerned only with giving rules which preserve usability.
Later, when we introduce the idea of usability-enhancing components, we will see that these
(very large) sets of (general) components that are granted access to interactive components can
be made far smaller.
Some simple results follow directly from this definition. For example, given some system
containing c and i , if c  i for i an interactive component, then c ∈ Ai , which is itself a special
case of the more general result that if c  d and d ∈ Ai for some interactive component i , then
c ∈ Ai .
3.2 Disconnect Tactic
The disconnect tactic removes a connection between a source component and a target compo-
nent. This is done by removing a connection between two components in the connection graph.
Structurally, a use of the target component is revoked from the source component. (It may be
that this gives us two completely disconnected sets of components.)
The disconnect tactic requires two parameters, i.e. the source component and the target
component.
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Definition 5 Disconnects from
If Σ = 〈C ,N , I ,A〉, then disconnecting ca ∈ C from cb ∈ C means deleting a connection,
〈ca , cb〉 ∈ N , and creating Σ′ = 〈C ,N ′, I ,A〉, where N ′ = N \ 〈ca , cb〉
3.3 Create Tactic
The create tactic creates a new component in the system. This is done by creating a new
component in the connection graph.
The create tactic requires two parameters, i.e. the component name and the component type
(i.e. general or interactive). Creating an interactive component requires an additional piece of
information: a set of components that are allowed to have access to that component. Note that
here we use an override operator ⊕: this updates a function at a point in its domain so that it
has a new value at that point.
Definition 6 Creates
If Σ = 〈C ,N , I ,A〉, then creating a new general ( i.e. non-interactive) component, c /∈ C ∧c /∈ I ,
means creating Σ′ = 〈C ∪ {c},N , I ,A〉. Creating a new interactive component, i /∈ C ∧ i /∈ I ,
means creating Σ′ = 〈C ∪ {i},N , I ∪ {i},A⊕ {i 7→ Ai ∪ i}}〉.
Definition 6 covers the case for creating the first component for a system. When creating the
first component we start with Σ = 〈{}, {}, {}, {}〉. After the creation of that first component c,
the system will then be Σ′ = 〈{c},N , I ,A〉, where c may be in I if it is interactive.
3.4 Delete Tactic
The delete tactic removes a component in the system. This is done by deleting a component in
the connection graph. However, the component needs to be isolated before the delete tactic is
used. A component is isolated when it has no connections to other components in the system.
The delete tactic only requires one parameter, i.e. the component to be removed.
Definition 7 Deletes
If Σ = 〈C ,N , I ,A〉, then deleting a non-interactive c ∈ C ∧ c /∈ I , means creating Σ′ =
〈C \{c},N , I ,A〉. Deleting an interactive component, i ∈ I , means creating Σ′ = 〈C \{i},N , I \
{i},A \ Ai〉. Delete is allowed iff the component is isolated, i.e. concerning c, ∀ ci ∈ C \ {c} ·
〈c, ci〉 /∈ N ∧ ∀ ci ∈ C \ {c} · 〈ci , c〉 /∈ N
3.5 Allow Tactic
The allow tactic allows a component to have access to an interactive component. This is done by
adding a component to the set of components that are allowed to have access to the interactive
one.
Definition 8 Add to Allowed set
If Σ = 〈C ,N , I ,A〉, then allowing ci access to cj means creating Σ′ = 〈C ,N , I ,A′〉, where
A′ = A⊕ {cj 7→ Acj ∪ {ci}} iff cj ∈ I . Otherwise, A′ = A.
The allow tactic loosens the restriction of the connect tactic. Given this loosening, we have
to be careful about what we claim for a system constructed with our tactics. In particular, we
have to ensure that the assumption that the family of sets of components A have been allowed
access to interactive components is made explicit in any guarantees we give about the system
constructed. So, if we have constructed the system 〈C ,N , I ,A〉 then we have to say that:
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assuming that the family of sets of components A have correctly been allowed to
access certain interactive components, then we guarantee that the constructed system
is usable
which we might write formally as1:
A < C ,N , I >
So, when we “hand” a system to a client, we hand them something that, as long as they use
it in the right context, i.e. any context in which the assumption is satisfied, i.e. any context
where it is permitted to allow the interactions that have been allowed to the components that
they have been granted to, then we guarantee that the system is usable. Stated alternatively (as
we mentioned above in a previous section) we can think of A as recording the permissions for
accessing interactive components, so A < C ,N , I > is saying that assuming that we are happy
to allow the permissions as given in A, then the system as described by < C ,N , I > is usable.
It is useful to think of this notation as stating a contract between modeller and client. It
makes plain exactly what is being assumed (A), and exactly what may then be taken to be a
usable system (< C ,N , I >) under those assumptions.
There are, in particular, no conditions put on what sort of context we are talking about
here; all we are doing is saying that as long as the context of use can satisfy the assumptions
stated then this is a usable design. We are recording assumptions relating to the structure of
the recorded design, and terms like usable, interactive component etc. are left up to the user to
instantiate as they see fit. They are like parameters to the design and, as ever, a conversation
between whoever builds the system according a design given in the manner we are showing here
and the end-user needs to be had in order that the correct instantiations of these terms is made.
3.6 Revoke Tactic
The revoke tactic disallows a component access to an interactive component. This is done by
removing a component from the set components that are allowed to have access to that interactive
component. We have to restrict use of this tactic to situations where the component whose access
is being revoked is not on any path that contains the interactive component concerned.
Definition 9 Revoke from Allowed set
If Σ = 〈C ,N , I ,A〉, then revoking c’s access to interactive component i means creating Σ′ =
〈C ,N , I ,A′〉, where A′ = A⊕{i 7→ {Ai \ {c}} with the restriction that there is no path that both
c and i are on, i.e. it is not that case that c  Σ i .
4 The rules
In this section we re-state the rules above in a more formal setting. This does two things: it
makes clear exactly what is being assumed and what is being concluded; and it allows us to
move towards a logic for usable systems, which itself (via a proof assistant, theorem-prover or
other programmed form of the rules coupled with some search strategy) leads to algorithmic
construction of usable systems. We expand on these points as follows:
• they allow goal-directed construction (examples below), because a rule read backwards (or
upwards) tells us what we must show in order to have the conclusion we desire;
1The symbol  is borrowed from formal logic, and there it is usually called a turnstile. These are conventionally
used to seperate assumptions from conclusions, hence our use of the symbol here
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• they are good for design in general since such rules—
– provide some guidance (the shape of the desired system determines, to some extent,
the rules that must be used to build it);
– suggest a pattern to look for (the use of a restricted set of rules soon gives rise to
repeated patterns of development, which then gives rise in turn to derived rules which
usefully encode recurring, common patterns);
– ease explanation (the structure suggest the form and content of answers to the ques-
tion: how was this system constructed, and why is it usable?);
– promote understanding (see: all the above);
• although we trade away complete flexibility (i.e. on the fly, ad hoc design), we gain better
understanding, structure, robustness etc.;
• they take us towards a method for checking and building systems: the rules, being formal,
can easily be read as algorithms.
The rules will (following standard methods) follow from the definitions of the tactics that
we have given earlier in the paper. Note that all of the tactics essentially tell us how to add
to or delete from sets of values of various sorts (components, connections, certain subsets of
components, along with certain conditions etc.) and these sorts of definitions, while defining
the vocabulary of a way of developing our systems, do not extend the logical basis that we
are working from (which is just standard set theory for us here). We say that our system is a
conservative extension of set theory: conservative because it does not introduce any new rules to
the underlying set theory: we might say that, via the new terms introduced via the definitions,
i.e. the new vocabulary, we “repackage” combinations of existing set theory rules to give us rules
in the vocabulary of our usable systems.
So, the logic of set theory can be used to express, via our definitions, a logic for our system.
To give a flavour of this, consider the following (artificially simple) definition:
S =def {x ∈ T | P(x )}
where T is some already known set and P is some predicate over members of T . This defines
the new set S in terms of T and P .
From this definition we can read-off rules which allow us to introduce sets like S , and to
deconstruct them too.
So we have rules like:









4.1 Creates and Deletes
Creates is easy, and has two introduction rules, one for each class of component (general or
interactive).
First, a general, non-interactive component is created:
A  〈C ,N , I 〉 c /∈ C
create+1
A  〈C ∪ {c},N , I 〉
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Then, an interactive component:
A  〈C ,N , I 〉 i /∈ C
create+2
A⊕ {i 7→ {i}}  〈C ∪ {i},N , I ∪ {i}〉
Deletes is slightly more complicated since we have to make sure that the component we are
deleting is isolated, which means that there are no connections either into or out of it and that
it appears in no interactive component’s allowed set.
These two conditions are enforced in the premises of the rules: the first by requiring that in
order to delete component c we have
∀ ci ∈ C \ {c} · 〈c, ci〉 /∈ N ∧ ∀ ci ∈ C \ {c} · 〈ci , c〉 /∈ N
which we denote by isolated c, and the second by requiring that for a system with interactive set
I and assumption set Ai for i ∈ I , where we are deleting component c
∀ i ∈ I .c /∈ Ai
The first rule talks about deleting a non-interactive component:
A  〈C ,N , I 〉 c ∈ C c /∈ I isolated c ∀ i ∈ I .c /∈ Ai
delete+1
A  〈C \ {c},N , I 〉
Then, we have a rule to delete an interactive component:
A  〈C ,N , I 〉 i ∈ C i ∈ I isolated i ∀ i ′ ∈ I .i /∈ A′i
delete+2
A \Ai  〈C \ {i},N , I \ {i}〉
and note that we have allowed interactive components to be allowed access to other such
components.
4.2 Disconnect rule
Consider the disconnect tactic, and recall its definition:
Disconnects from
If Σ = 〈C ,N , I ,A〉, then disconnecting ca ∈ C from cb ∈ C means deleting a
connection, 〈ca , cb〉 ∈ N , and creating Σ′ = 〈C ,N ′, I ,A〉, where N ′ = N \ 〈ca , cb〉
This gives us two rules: one “introduction” rule for moving from a system with a certain
connection to one where a disconnection (i.e. removal of that certain connection) has happened:
A  〈C ,N , I 〉 〈ca , cb〉 ∈ N
disconnect+
A  〈C ,N \ 〈ca , cb〉, I 〉
and an “elimination” rule which, given a system that has had a disconnection performed on it,
can “reverse” this (somewhat artificially perhaps, but it is a rule we gain nonetheless):
A  〈C ,N , I 〉 ca , cb ∈ C
disconnect−
A  〈C ,N ∪ {〈ca , cb〉}, I 〉
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4.3 Connect rule
Recall that we assume that all components are connected to themselves.
A  〈C ,N , I 〉 ca ∈ C cb ∈ C
∀ i ∈ I .∀ c, d ′ ∈ C .∀ d ∈ cb  d ′.∀ c′ ∈ c  ca .d ∈ Ai ⇒ c′ ∈ Ai···
d ∈ Ai ⇒ c′ ∈ Ai
connect+
A  〈C , I ∪ 〈ca , cb〉, I 〉
Note that we may have to use allowed+ (coming soon) before these rules in order that we can
connect to an interactive component.
4.4 Revoke and allowed
Rules for taking away and adding something from the set of those things allowed access to some
interactive component.
Σ cj ∈ I ci ∈ Acj 〈ci , cj 〉 /∈ N c ∈ C , 〈ci , c〉 ∈ N , ci /∈ I ` c /∈ Ccj ∨ c ∈ I
revoke+
A⊕ {cj 7→ Acj \ {ci}}  〈C ,N , I 〉
We could have expressed this as two introduction rules, one for each of the two disjuncts in
the final premise, i.e. two different final premises:
Σ cj ∈ I ci ∈ Acj 〈ci , cj 〉 /∈ N c ∈ C , 〈ci , c〉 ∈ N , ci /∈ I ` c /∈ Ccj
revoke+1
A⊕ {cj 7→ Acj \ {ci}}  〈C ,N , I 〉
Σ cj ∈ I ci ∈ Acj 〈ci , cj 〉 /∈ N c ∈ C , 〈ci , c〉 ∈ N , ci /∈ I ` c ∈ I
revoke+2
A⊕ {cj 7→ Acj \ {ci}}  〈C ,N , I 〉
(Note: each final premise in each of these rules uses an alternative, standard, notation for
introducing assumptions that are local to a premise. It is a syntactic variant to the way this was
done in the connect+ rule above. This is our preferred notation; the previous version was used
just for reasons of space.)
The point of the allowed set for some interactive component is that it records our actions in
granting access since this forms part of our contract. Recall that A  〈C ,N , I 〉 simply means
that assuming we have correctly (acceptably) granted access as recorded in A, then the system
is usable.
A  〈C ,N , I 〉 i ∈ I c ∈ C
allowed+
A⊕ {i 7→ Ai ∪ {c}}  〈C ,N , I 〉
4.5 General rules
We will allow any first-order logic and set theory rules to be used within our proofs. The only
other rules that are specific to our systems will be to do with naming conventions. One commonly
used rule set (which makes the statement of some of the other rules more straightforward) allows
us to switch between using a single designation for a system where, in fact, the components form
disjoint sets (and therefore all the connections and interactive components are in disjoint sets
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too, and so they can be though of as two different systems). Going from a single system to
one which is actually two disjoint systems can happen when we delete connections, for example.
But sometimes when we delete a connection we stay with a single system (i.e. the components
don’t fall into disjoint sets). Rather than have different rules for these different cases it is more
convenient to allow a system which is actually two disjoint systems to be named as either one
system or two. The following rules make all this clear:
Aa  〈C a ,N a , I a〉 Ab  〈C b ,N b , I b〉 C a ∩ C b = ∅
naming1
Aa ∪Ab  〈C a ∪ C b ,N a ∪N b , I a ∪ I b〉
A  〈C ,N , I 〉 C = C a ∪D C a ∩D = ∅
naming2
Aa  〈C a ,N a , I a〉
The first rule here says that two disjoint systems a can be thought of as a single system. The
second says that if we have any single system which actually consists of two disjoint systems then
the two systems can be picked out. (Note: once C a is determined then N a and I a and Aa can
be calculated, and the same for C b . Also, if we chose D to be ∅ then naming2 becomes trivial,
since it says that a system can be replaced by itself, because the premises mean that C = C a .)
Finally we have an axiom (i.e. a rule with no premises, which just says that its conclusion is
proved without any further work) for the simplest (useless) system as mentioned before:
axiom
∅  〈∅, ∅, ∅〉
4.6 Tiny example
4.6.1 connect+ and disconnect+ are inverses:
If we make a new connection and then disconnect immediately afterwards we get back to the
same system that we started with.
As we can see from this tiny proof in Figure 1, under the assumptions that we start with
the system A  〈C ,N , I 〉 where ca ∈ C and cb ∈ C and assuming all the components involved
respect the accessibility requirements of i as summarised in Ai (which is what the fourth—big–
premise is saying), which allow a connection to happen, then undoing the connection results in
the system A  〈C ,N , I 〉 we started with.
This is about the simplest general property we would expect to be provable if the rules have
correctly captured the intended meaning of such systems and their properties. Showing that
such proofs are possible is part of the usual validation process for any formalisation.
We also give the proof required to construct a small part of a system, where we prove that the
fragment where G and H connect with interactive component A, as in Figure 5, is constructible.
5 Usage
Apart from giving us a logic for reasoning about systems, these rules can help guide us in
the construction of systems. For example, say we had to construct a system of the form A 
〈C , {〈da , db〉, 〈ca , cb〉}, I 〉, then disconnect−, read “upwards” tells us that we must show how to
construct a system of the form A  〈C , {〈da , db〉}, I 〉 and also show that ca , cb ∈ C . So, starting
with a desired system, and using the rules upwards, we get some guidance, via pattern matching
the system we want with the conclusions of the rules, as to how to build it. If we continue this























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5: A tiny system
require no further proof (for example the system ∅  〈∅, ∅, ∅〉 is trivially constructible and usable;
it is like the zero of usable systems) then by reading the proof tree “forwards” we see both how
to construct our desired system and have a proof that it is usable.
Our new logic (for usable systems) inherits the internal consistency of the underlying logic
since the new logic was produced via conservative extension, and so it is sound, which means
that any system constructed via the rules is guaranteed to be usable.
6 Introducing usability-enhancing components
Next we can introduce usability-enhancing (not merely “interactive”) components which some
components in I might be, or that can play the role of, wrappers that guard the rest of the system
against non-usability to make I components usable. Further, we might have some abstraction
mechanism which hides interactions (within the interactive component) which are deemed unus-
able by, say, the component’s designer.
Then we have a condition that simplifies the structure by making the Ai smaller by shrinking
the family of sets A: if some components have been proved to be usability-enhancing, or been
proved the protect the system against undesirable (and otherwise non-usable components—i.e.
components that we might want in the system because of some very useful properties they
have, but which are otherwise appallingly non-usable) by wrapping them up or filtering out or
restricting their undesirable features, then we can take away some of the assumptions (which is
what A is essentially giving us) and get a simpler design.
As we said above, almost all components will be in almost all assumption sets, due to the
requirements of the construction method, and its focus on guaranteeing that only usable systems
are constructible. So, remember we had the idea of a contract of the form
A < C ,N , I >
where A is to be thought of as an assumption that as long it is acceptable that the components
granted access to interactive elements are as given in A then the system is usable.
Figure 6 is a small example system built using the rules introduced in previous sections. We
can see that the assumption sets contain almost all components. While we have a usable system,
when those assumptions are taken into account, it would clearly be better (fewer assumptions
means fewer opportunities for making an error or a wrong assumption about usability) to simplify
















Figure 6: A typical interactive system, without usability-enhancing components
components comes in. Specifically, given the size of the family A in this case (composed from
the union of the sets AI1 and AI1), the obvious question is: can we make it smaller (and hence
make the system simpler)? This is where the notion of a usability-enhancing component enters
the story.
A component is usability − enhancing if we have verified that it can itself be assumed to
be given access to any interactive component, and that it provides a barrier which stops com-
ponents from accessing an interactive component inappropriately (i.e. maliciously or in some
way detrimental to the system). Since it provides such a barrier, components which have to “go
through” the usability-enhancing component to access an interactive component do not need to
be in the set of components assumed to access that interactive component since we have verified
that the usability-enhancing component stops any unusable behaviour. So, having designated a
component as usability-enhancing, we can perform a simplification operation on the system in
order to drop components from the assumption sets since we no longer need to make assumptions
about them while preserving usability.
The idea of a usability-enhancing component forming a barrier is formalised by saying that if
a usability-enhancing component t exists between a component n and an interactive component
i , then that component n does not need to be recorded as being in the set of components allowed
access to that interactive component i . There is a proviso here: if the component n we are
considering can access the component i via another path that does not go through the usability-
enhancing component t then it clearly must stay in the assumption set for that interactive
component.
In readiness for this we extend the idea of a system so that it now includes a set U of
usability-enhancing components (a subset of the set of all components). A system is now of the
form A < C ,N ,U , I >. It is clear that if formerly we had the system A < C ,N , I > then

















Figure 7: Example system with one usability-enhancing component
usability-enhancing components in this system.
Then we have the following result, which codifies the reasoning above, including the restric-
tions.
Lemma 1 Healthiness due to usability-enhancing components
Consider a system Σ of the form A < C ,N ,U , I >. Assume one of the components u in C
is designated as a usability − enhancing component (as in the discussion above). Then we have
an equivalently usable system Σ′ of the form A′ < C ,N ,U ∪ {u}, I > and A′ is related to A as
follows:
• for all interactive components i ∈ I , all components of A that are only on paths that are
prefixes of paths from u to i are removed from Ai
The set of components that remains from Ai , due to the clauses above, form A
′
i .
The only in the clause above arises due to the proviso that a component may have another
path to the interactive component where the interactive component is not “protected” by the
trusted component, and we need to be aware of this and guard against trusting such a component.
7 Discussion
Recall that one of the aims of this paper was to give usable-by-construction rules for systems
with usability-enhancing, interactive and general components in the context of designing, at an
initial abstract level, usable systems
This aim turned out to be very hard to achieve because of all the conditions around when it is

















Figure 8: Example system with two usability-enhancing components
ad hoc means (some of this can be seen in a different guise in for example [12]) but we could
never convince ourselves, let alone prove, that the rules for building such a system were sound.
This happened because the rules themselves had many provisos and hence reasoning about how
they interacted when we used them to build large systems soon became impossible. Clearly,
another approach was needed.
We used two strategies: start with a very few, simple (which means: no or few provisos)
basic rules, and build more complex systems with a very few rules of composition (which take
existing—probably partial—systems and combine or compose them into larger systems); do not
try to “do everything at once”. This led to the idea of first building systems without considering
notions of usabilty-enhancing components, and then, once such systems could be built, add a
notion of such components and see how the existing systems without them could be transformed
into systems with them, our final goal.
Now have a simple, stable basis upon which to build more sophisticated derived rules, if we
need them.
It is possible that we have paid a price for all this: perhaps few systems are actually now
constructible with our simple rules. This might (depending on your point-of-view) be outweighed
by being much more certain that the system we can build are better structured and more
amenable to reasoning. We, of course, believe that this is a price that is very well-worth paying.
The simplicity and regularity of the rules means that we now have a hope of proving soundness




The work recounted here, which centres around a need to consider the ways of designing and
constructing a usable system made of various components, has several properties:
• It allows an abstract characterisation of a usable system;
• It has logical rules that allow for checking and construction;
• Any complicated system may be built in terms of simpler ones using a small set of opera-
tions;
• We may use it as a basis for deriving further construction operations.
The rules here are, of course, tedious to use by hand (as the examples show), but we can
express the rules very directly in the various proof assistants available (e.g. PVS [11]) or perhaps
program them in a language that already deals with search, like Prolog. Then by giving the
desired system as conjecture to the proof assistant or a goal to a Prolog program, it can be
used to (mainly automatically, given the simplicity of our rules) then construct a proof that the
system is usable. For realistically large systems, with hundreds of components, this would be an
important feature.
Another way of seeing this utility is to acknowledge that one the problems with realistically
large systems is keeping track of dependencies (like our “allowed access to interaction” idea) and
the rules given here do that. The fact that a large system, once built, can automatically be
checked for conformance to requirements of dependencies is obviously valuable (even if the idea
of having a logic to construct such system does not appeal).
There remains the question of how a very abstract model, once we have one, can be used
as the basis for an implementation. Our expectation would be to proceed via the existing and
well-known and established techniques that are called refinement [6], which would take us from
a design that provably has the required properties (i.e. built with usability as a constructed
and provably existing property) to provably usable implementations, since the central point of
refinement is that it allows us to move from abstract to concrete (design to implementation)
while preserving meaning and properties. Taken together, then, we have rules that allow us to
design and specify usable systems, and refinement rules that, preserving usability, take us to
implementations or provably usable systems.
Future work involves taking the concepts in ISO 9241 which seek to define usability and
seeing how they interact with the work here.
Finally, this abstract system does not have the interpretation of components decided in any
way, though the idea of “interactive” does begin to impose one. However, we have a set of rules
here which simply allows construction of connected components where some needed properties
which make a system “proper” can be kept track of—so this has general application.
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